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CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT ADOPTS A
FOUR-PRONG TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER MIRANDA
WARNINGS ARE SUFFICIENT TO CURE A FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATION
STATE V. GAY, 2008 ND 84, 748 N.W.2D 408
I.

FACTS

On May 3, 2007, the Northwest Narcotics Task Force received information indicating that probationer Ben Smith would be selling drugs in
Williston, North Dakota.1 The tip claimed that Smith planned to meet a
man driving a black car at Smith’s workplace and that the person meeting
Smith intended to buy methamphetamine.2 The informant conveyed the information to probation officers Darin Cote and Lloyd Haagenson as well as
other law enforcement officials.3
After receiving the tip, several law enforcement officers watched
Smith’s workplace and saw another male, later identified as David Gay, get
into Smith’s vehicle with him.4 Deputy Verlan Kvande of the Williams
County Sheriff’s Office knew that law enforcement had received information and aided the Sheriff’s Office in the investigation.5 Deputy Kvande assisted with the investigation after the other officers stopped Smith’s car.6
1. State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, ¶ 2, 748 N.W.2d 408, 411. Smith was a felon on probation for
drug convictions in two separate counties. Brief for Appellant at ¶ 4, State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84,
748 N.W.2d 408 (No. 20070348). The identity of the informant was not disclosed in any of the
police reports, testimony, or affidavits submitted during the pretrial suppression hearing. Gay, ¶
2, 748 N.W.2d at 411.
2. Gay, ¶ 2, 748 N.W.2d at 411. The unknown male arranged to buy a half-ounce of methamphetamine from Smith. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 5.
3. Gay, ¶ 2, 748 N.W.2d at 411. Probation Officer Cote and law enforcement set up surveillance at Dakota Farms Restaurant, Smith’s place of employment. Brief for Appellant, supra note
1, ¶ 5.
4. Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411. The officers noticed an adult male drive into the restaurant’s parking lot and park next to Smith’s vehicle. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 5. Gay
exited his vehicle and entered the passenger side of Smith’s vehicle. Id. The police followed
Smith and Gay to a gravel parking lot. Id. Smith was spotted in the lot near a storage unit a short
distance from his car. Id. Smith was speaking to an individual named Bryce Raad, a known drug
user. Id.
5. Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411. Deputy Kvande did not know the source of the information
or whether the source was reliable. Brief for Appellee at ¶ 10, State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, 748
N.W.2d 408 (No. 20070348). Deputy Kvande did not participate in the surveillance of Smith’s
place of employment. Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411.
6. Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411. The stop occurred several blocks from Smith’s place of employment. Id.
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The officers were conducting a probation search of Smith and his vehicle
when Deputy Kvande arrived on the scene.7 Officers also handcuffed the
passenger, David Gay, before Deputy Kvande arrived.8 Prior to Deputy
Kvande’s contact with Gay, officers read Gay his Miranda rights and handcuffed him for officer safety.9 Deputy Kvande testified that he re-read the
Miranda warnings to Gay, who was still handcuffed, and with Gay’s consent conducted a pat-down search for weapons.10 No drugs, weapons, or
other illegal materials were found on Gay’s person, but the officers discovered a large sum of cash in Smith’s pocket and methamphetamine paraphernalia in Smith’s car.11
Deputy Kvande testified that he spoke with Gay after the pat-down
search and Miranda recitation.12 Gay was still handcuffed at that time.13
Deputy Kvande testified that Gay stated he was not involved in any drug
deal, but that he smoked marijuana the previous day.14 Kvande then placed
Gay under arrest.15 Officers detained Gay with handcuffs for about fifteen
minutes prior to his formal arrest.16
David Gay was arrested for ingestion of a controlled substance (marijuana), which is a class A misdemeanor in North Dakota.17 Gay brought a
motion to suppress the statement he made to Deputy Kvande about smoking
marijuana.18 The district court granted the motion on the ground that the
basis for questioning Gay terminated after the initial search revealed that
Gay was not a risk to officer safety.19 The district court then determined
that probable cause for Gay’s continued detention did not exist when he

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. When Kvande arrived, Gay was standing by Smith’s vehicle with his hands handcuffed behind his back. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 14.
10. Gay, ¶ 4, 748 N.W.2d at 411. Kvande believed that officers also searched Gay for weapons prior to Kvande’s arrival on the scene. Id.
11. Id. Deputy Kvande’s report and testimony did not indicate whether the cash and paraphernalia were found before the first officers at the scene handcuffed Gay. Id. Gay told Kvande
that he came to Williston to buy a car from Smith. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 7.
12. Gay, ¶ 5, 748 N.W.2d at 411-12. Kvande left Gay for some time in order to assist officers with the third individual on the scene. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 7.
13. Gay, ¶ 5, 748 N.W.2d at 412.
14. Id. Gay told Deputy Kvande that smoking marijuana was not illegal and that law enforcement could not do anything about it. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 7.
15. Gay, ¶ 5, 748 N.W.2d at 412.
16. Id.
17. Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, ¶ 5; N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-22.3 (Supp. 2007).
18. Gay, ¶ 6, 748 N.W.2d at 412. Deputy Kvande was the only witness called by the state at
the suppression hearing to testify regarding the investigation, charge, and arrest of Gay. Id. ¶ 3,
748 N.W.2d at 411.
19. Id. ¶ 6, 748 N.W.2d at 412. The district court explained the legal rationale underlying its
decision on the record, but did not create written findings of fact. Id. ¶ 3, 748 N.W.2d at 411.
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admitted to smoking marijuana.20 The district court further noted that being
handcuffed was intimidating to the point that Miranda warnings did not
cure the unlawful arrest.21 The State appealed the suppression order, arguing the district court erred because the search and seizure of Gay was reasonable under both the United States Constitution and the North Dakota
Constitution.22 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s suppression order.23 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
administration of Miranda warnings to protect Gay’s right not to incriminate himself did not cure the ongoing Fourth Amendment violation.24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule to
prohibit evidence that is seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment from
being admitted against the victim of the unlawful search.25 To understand
the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence, an overview of the rule and
discussion of the rule’s application to verbal statements is provided.26 Next,
the reasonableness of pat-down searches is examined.27 Then, an explanation of the application of North Dakota’s search and seizure law to vehicle
passengers is considered.28 The next section examines the limitations imposed on a probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights in North Dakota.29 After the basic framework is established, the interaction between the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments is discussed.30 Finally, the prosecution’s statutory
right to appeal in North Dakota is addressed.31

20. Id. ¶ 6, 748 N.W.2d at 412.
21. Id.
22. Id. ¶ 7.
23. Id. ¶ 25, 748 N.W.2d at 417.
24. Id. ¶ 24.
.
25 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914). See also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 28 (4th ed. 2004) (1978) (“The nature of the exclusionary rule is such that
it makes the cost of honoring the Fourth Amendment apparent.”).
26. See discussion infra Part II.A (providing an overview of the exclusionary rule and discussing the rule’s application to verbal statements).
27. See discussion infra Part II.B (examining the reasonableness of pat-down searches and
stop and frisks).
28. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing searches and seizures of vehicle passengers in
North Dakota).
29. See discussion infra Part II.D (examining a probationer’s limited Fourth Amendment
rights in North Dakota).
30. See discussion infra Part II.E (discussing the interaction between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments).
31. See discussion infra Part II.F (addressing the statutory limitation upon a prosecutor’s
right to appeal in a criminal case).
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A. APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO VERBAL
EVIDENCE
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures; and it applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.32 The Fourth Amendment is a safeguard against
government intrusion embedded in the United States Constitution.33 The
North Dakota Constitution also protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.34 The Fourth Amendment does not, however, define the word
“unreasonable.”35 The amendment also does not describe the relationship
between the clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and the conditions
under which warrants may issue.36 Further, the Fourth Amendment is void
of any language barring unlawfully seized items from evidence—now
known as the exclusionary rule.37
1.

Overview of the Exclusionary Rule

Courts initially formulated the exclusionary rule to serve two primary
purposes: (1) to deter unreasonable searches and seizures and (2) to promote judicial integrity.38 Recognition of these rationales by the United
States Supreme Court largely dictated the scope of the rule.39 Adherence to
the rationales, however, prompted several exceptions to the rule.40

32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV & XIV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 5 (quoting JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1966)).
.
34 N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.”
35. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 8 (discussing the origins of the Fourth Amendment).
36. Id.
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (noting the absence of any express remedy). See also 1
LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 28-29 (stating that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment may not have
contemplated the exclusionary sanction, but certainly envisioned compliance with the Fourth
Amendment).
38. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-23 (1960).
39. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 23 (stating that the Supreme Court’s perception of the
rule shaped its scope and could determine its fate).
40. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 258-85 (4th ed. 2004) (1978) (generally discussing the exceptions to the exclusionary rule).
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The “independent source” exception allows the admission of evidence
gained independent of unlawful police activity.41 Specifically, the exception allows certain facts that are gained through an independent source to be
used as evidence.42 The other relevant exception is the “attenuation doctrine” or the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,” which allows the government to establish a causal connection between the unlawful activity of
law enforcement and the evidence obtained.43 The causal connection must
be “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” of the unlawful events.44 This
doctrine applies not only to tangible evidence, but also to verbal statements.45
2.

Exclusionary Rule Applied to Verbal Evidence

In 1963, the United States Supreme Court decided Wong Sun v. United
States,46 which declared that verbal evidence derived from an illegal arrest
“is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible
fruits” of an unwarranted arrest.47 In Wong Sun, federal agents arrested
Hom Way for heroin possession.48 Hom Way, who was not a police informant, told agents that he bought an ounce of heroin from “Blackie Toy,” an
owner of a laundromat.49 Several agents then went to a laundromat owned
by James Wah Toy.50 Agents handcuffed and arrested Toy, but found no
narcotics on the premises.51 Toy then told the agents that he did not sell
narcotics, but knew someone named “Johnny” who did.52 Agents proceeded to Johnny Yee’s house, entered, and found Yee in the bedroom.53
Yee took several tubes containing heroin from a drawer and surrendered the
drugs to the agents.54

41. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (allowing facts
obtained through an independent source to be used as evidence).
42. Id.
43. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1939).
44. Id. at 341.
45. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) (applying the exclusionary rule
to a verbal confession); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961) (excluding verbal evidence obtained by law enforcement through illegal wire-tapping).
46. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
47. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485.
48. Id. at 473.
49. Id. Hom Way told the agents that the laundry was on Leavenworth Street. Id.
50. Id. Toy owned a laundry located on Leavenworth Street. Id. at 474.
51. Id. The Court’s record did not identify James Wah Toy as “Blackie Toy.” Id.
52. Id. Toy described the house where Johnny lived. Id. He also described a bedroom in
which Johnny kept approximately an ounce of heroin. Id.
53. Id. at 475.
54. Id. Yee surrendered less than one ounce of heroin. Id.
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Agents took Yee and Toy to the Office of the Bureau of Narcotics
where Yee told officers that Toy and a man called “Sea Dog” brought the
seized heroin to Yee four days earlier.55 Toy told the agents that “Sea Dog”
was actually Wong Sun.56 James Wah Toy, Johnny Yee, and Wong Sun
were arraigned and released on their own recognizance.57 A few days later,
agents interrogated all three men at the Narcotics Bureau.58
The Government’s evidence at trial consisted of four items: (1) the
statements Toy made at the time of his arrest; (2) the heroin from Yee’s
house; (3) Toy’s unsigned statement; and (4) Wong Sun’s unsigned statement.59 The district court admitted all four items over objections that the
evidence constituted inadmissible “fruits” of unlawful arrests or searches.60
Wong Sun and James Wah Toy appealed after they were convicted of
transportation and concealment of heroin.61 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the arrests of Toy and Wong Sun were unlawful because
the arrests were not based on probable cause within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.62 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless
held that the four items of evidence were not “fruits” of the unlawful arrests
and thus were properly admitted at trial.63
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and declared that verbal evidence derived from an unlawful entry or arrest may
constitute a “fruit” in the same way as tangible items.64 The Court recognized that the underlying purposes of the exclusionary rule did not suggest a
reason for distinguishing between physical and verbal evidence.65 Rather,
the Court stated that a distinction between physical and verbal evidence
might damage the underlying policies of the rule.66

55. Id.
56. Id. Toy showed officers where Wong Sun lived. Id. Several officers entered the apartment and brought Wong Sun out handcuffed. Id. The officers searched the apartment but did not
find narcotics. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 476. An agent advised the men of their right to withhold information and their
right to counsel. Id. Toy’s statement was read to him, but he refused to sign it. Id. Wong Sun also
refused to sign his statement, but he admitted its accuracy to the officers. Id. at 477.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 473.
62. Id. at 477.
63. Id. at 478.
64. Id. at 485.
65. Id. at 486.
66. Id. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-23 (1960) (proclaiming that judicial
integrity is protected by the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (stating that excluding evidence is the foremost method of discouraging unlawful police conduct).
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The Supreme Court assessed the evidence that prompted the officers to
investigate Toy’s laundry and determined that the officers did not have
probable cause to procure a warrant for Toy’s arrest.67 The lack of probable
cause made Toy’s arrest unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.68 The unlawful activity prompted application of the exclusionary rule to Toy’s
statements.69 The statements led law enforcement to Yee’s home, thus enabling the officers to discover the drugs by utilizing the unlawfully obtained
statements.70 The Court deemed the drugs “fruits” of the unlawful activity
and consequently inadmissible against Toy.71
The Court then applied the attenuation doctrine to Wong Sun’s unsigned confession.72 The Court determined that the confession was not the
fruit of an unlawful arrest, because the causal connection between the arrest
and the confession attenuated the constitutional violation.73 The Court
overturned Toy’s conviction, and held that Wong Sun was entitled to a new
trial.74
The Wong Sun Court did not explicitly declare that all unlawfully obtained statements must be excluded from evidence.75 Exclusion of improperly seized evidence is initially prompted by an unlawful or unreasonable
search, but the attenuation question depends upon the specific facts of each
case.76 Ordinarily, law enforcement must procure advance judicial authorization through the use of warrants to conduct searches and seizures.77 The
United States Supreme Court, however, formulated a limited exception to

67. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484.
68. Id.
69. Id. After determining that the exclusionary rule applied to Toy’s statements, the Court
analyzed the narcotics seized from Johnny Yee. Id. at 487.
70. Id. at 488.
71. Id. As applied to Toy, the Court determined that neither the independent source exception nor the attenuation doctrine applied to the drugs found at Yee’s residence. Id. at 487 (citing
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) and Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
72. Id. at 491.
73. Id. (citing Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341). Wong Sun was released after a lawful arraignment, but voluntarily returned several days later to make the statement. Id.
74. Id. at 491, 493.
75. Id. at 491-92. See also 6 LAFAVE, supra note 40, at 287 (recognizing that Wong Sun
does not bar all statements made following an unlawful arrest).
76. 6 LAFAVE, supra note 40, at 259 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
77. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (reaffirming that law enforcement must utilize
the warrant procedure whenever practicable); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)
(holding that the admission of papers seized without a warrant was prejudicial error).
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the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and seizures and the warrant requirement.78
B. REASONABLENESS OF PAT-DOWN SEARCHES
In Terry v. Ohio,79 the United States Supreme Court outlined both the
prerequisites and underlying purposes of pat-down searches.80 This form of
police contact is commonly called a “stop and frisk.”81 The Court proclaimed that police officers may conduct a brief search of a person’s outer
clothing if the officer has reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause,
to believe that the person is armed and dangerous.82 Such a search is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized
may be introduced as evidence against the person.83 These intrusive means
are permitted to protect police officers and others in the area of the search.84
The Court characterized the intrusions as “less than a ‘full’ search.”85 The
next section will examine Terry and the reasonableness of stop and frisks.86
The subsequent section will then provide an assessment of whether handcuffs may be used during a frisk search and the duration of time reasonably
allowed to conduct a frisk.87

78. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 (declaring that police officers are allowed to conduct frisks
of a person’s outer clothing upon reasonable suspicion that the person is presently armed and dangerous).
79. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
80. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
81. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 636 (1991) (rejecting the suggestion that
the use of such terms as “stop” and “frisk” place the police conduct outside the scope of the
Fourth Amendment).
82. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The Court set forth the “stop and frisk” standard as:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him.
Id.
83. Id. at 31.
84. Id. at 26.
85. Id.
86. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (examining the United States Supreme Court’s validation
of frisk searches).
87. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing whether handcuffs may be used to effectuate
a frisk and the duration of time which will be considered reasonable).
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1. The United States Supreme Court Validates Stop and Frisk
Searches
In Terry, the defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon
after Detective Martin McFadden grabbed John Terry, spun him around,
and felt the outside of his clothing, which revealed a pistol.88 The ultimate
issue was whether, under the totality of the circumstances approach, the officer’s actions violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.89 The
Court first analyzed whether Terry was “seized” by Officer McFadden and
whether, and at what point, McFadden conducted a “search.”90
The State argued that a stop and frisk did not rise to the level of a
“search” or a “seizure.”91 The Court rejected the notion that a stop and frisk
conducted by police officers was outside the realm of the Fourth Amendment.92 In defining a seizure, the Supreme Court stated that a person is
seized whenever a police officer confronts the person and restrains the person’s freedom to walk away.93 Thus, the Fourth Amendment does not exclusively apply to circumstances when police make a “technical arrest” or
conduct a “full-blown search.”94 The Court held that Officer McFadden
seized Terry and subjected him to a search when the officer felt the outer
surfaces of Terry’s clothing.95
The Court, however, chose not to invalidate prior holdings that police
must, whenever practicable, obtain warrants prior to conducting searches
and seizures.96 Instead, the Court determined that the conduct in Terry did
not necessitate an assessment of probable cause, but rather reasonableness.97 The Court then examined the reasonableness of the search and sei-

88. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. The officer observed two men, one later identified as John Terry,
standing on a street corner. Id. at 5. The officer noticed that one man would leave the other, pause
and look in a store window, walk past the store, turn around, and walk back to the corner pausing
to look in the store window again. Id. at 6. The other man would then repeat these actions. Id.
Each of the men did this about five or six times. Id. A third man approached the men, spoke with
them briefly, and all three men left the street corner. Id. Officer McFadden believed that the men
were “casing” a robbery. Id. McFadden followed the men and approached them. Id. He identified
himself as a law enforcement officer then asked the men for their names. Id. at 6-7. After the men
“mumbled something” in response to McFadden, he conducted the pat-down search of Terry. Id.
at 7. The officer then patted down the other two men and discovered a gun on one man. Id.
89. Id. at 8.
90. Id. at 16.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 19.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. An assessment of probable cause was not required because the police conduct was
not subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court stated that in deter-
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zure by analyzing whether the officer’s action was tenable from the beginning, and whether the action was reasonably related to the events that gave
rise to the intrusion.98 In order to meet the reasonableness threshold, the
Court first required that the police intrusion be supported by specific facts,
which reasonably warrant the interference.99 Next, the Court declared that
the search must be limited to the discovery of weapons that might be used
to harm the officer or others nearby.100 Ultimately, the Court declared a
stop and frisk a “protective search,” calling it a brief intrusion upon the dignity of the individual.101
The Court applied this standard and held that Officer McFadden’s actions against Terry were reasonable under the circumstances.102 The fact
that the officer limited his intrusion to what was necessary to learn whether
the men were armed was crucial to the Court’s decision.103 Officer McFadden limited the scope of the intrusion; thus, the weapon seized from Terry
was not subject to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.104 The Court,
however, did not determine a reasonable duration for conducting the stop,
or whether handcuffs could be used to effectuate the intrusion.105
2. Use of Handcuffs and Prolonged Detentions to Promote
Officer Safety
Two significant concepts emerged from the Supreme Court’s decision
in Terry: (1) a seizure need not be deemed an “arrest” to be subject to
Fourth Amendment requirements; and (2) a seizure that is limited in intrusiveness may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of probable cause, which is generally required.106 A Fourth Amendment analysis essentially requires a determination of whether police have

mining reasonableness, the test is the balance between the need to search and the intrusion that the
search involves. Id. at 21 (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)).
98. Id. at 19-20.
99. Id. at 21. The Court noted that the particular government interests involved were effective crime prevention, officer safety, and the safety of others. Id. at 22-24.
100. Id. at 26.
101. Id. The intrusion is to be evaluated under a “reasonably prudent man” standard, but giving due weight to the reasonable inferences which a police officer is allowed to deduce from his
experience in law enforcement. Id. at 27.
102. Id. at 28.
103. Id. at 30.
104. Id. at 30-31.
105. See id. at 30 (stating that each case must be decided on its own facts and limiting the
holding to the facts presented).
106. Id. at 26-30; see also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 12 (4th ed. 2004) (1978) (discussing whether a Fourth Amendment seizure
constitutes an arrest).
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made an arrest and, if so, when the arrest actually occurred.107 Physical restraint of an individual usually results in a conclusion that an arrest has been
made, which in turn requires probable cause.108 Since Terry, however, several courts and jurisdictions have held that the use of handcuffs in conducting a stop and frisk is reasonable.109
In United States v. Miller,110 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court’s determination that a Drug Enforcement Administration agent’s use of handcuffs on the defendant was the least intrusive means of conducting a Terry stop and was therefore reasonable under
Fourth Amendment analysis.111 The agents involved in the investigation
detained the defendants at an airport, searched their luggage, and found cocaine.112 The Eighth Circuit declined to mistrust the agent’s decision to use
handcuffs.113 The court stated that the nature of the crime of which the defendants were suspected—drug trafficking—created a reasonable concern
that the defendants carried weapons.114
In Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5,115 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that an investigative stop lasting from thirty-five to sixty minutes was reasonable and did not exceed the scope of a
Terry stop.116 After an alleged shooting at a bar, and amid police confusion, officers pulled over the two suspects as the suspects left the scene.117
Police detained and questioned the men, and searched their vehicle.118 The
officers did not find any evidence and released the men.119 The officer dis107. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 106, at 4 (examining the circumstances which may constitute
an arrest).
108. Id. at 9 (citing Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 632 (2003)).
109. See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that an officer’s
use of handcuffs was reasonable in conducting a Terry stop); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d
1286, 1290 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that an officer’s use of handcuffs as a protective measure was
not unreasonable or excessive); State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 1999) (holding that
briefly handcuffing vehicle occupants until officers determined that the occupants were not armed
was reasonable).
110. 974 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1992).
111. Miller, 974 F.2d at 957.
112. Id. at 956-57. A Los Angeles police officer alerted the agents of the defendants. Id. at
955. The police officer became suspicious of the defendants after questioning them in an airport.
Id. at 956.
113. Id. at 957. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the agent’s testimony, recognized that the suspects involved outnumbered law enforcement officials by six to three, and that
the agent’s safety concerns were sincere. Id.
114. Id.
115. 174 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1999).
116. Houston, 174 F.3d at 815.
117. Id. at 811-12.
118. Id. at 812. Both men denied being involved in the shooting. Id.
119. Id. Police also suspected the men of an assault on a security guard. Id. The officers did
not find any evidence that implicated the men on the assault. Id.
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patch logs showed that approximately thirty-three minutes elapsed between
the shooting and the release of the two suspects, but the suspects claimed
that the detention lasted about one hour.120 The suspects sued the officers,
alleging that the stop and detention violated their Fourth Amendment
rights.121 The men also argued that the use of weapons and handcuffs
turned the investigative stop into an arrest unsupported by probable
cause.122
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the investigative stop did
not evolve into an arrest that would require probable cause.123 The court
recognized that the length and method of an investigative stop must be rationally related to the reason for the primary intrusion.124 The court also
noted that a Terry stop may turn into an arrest by the passage of time or use
of force.125 However, the court determined that the officers did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.126 The court held that the use of handcuffs and the
detention in a police vehicle did not exceed the scope of Terry because the
precautions were rationally related to the investigation.127
The Sixth Circuit stated that law enforcement officers can conduct a
more exhaustive detention and questioning when their suspicions are not
initially dispelled.128 The court also declared that meeting the Terry requirements does not involve a precise time limit.129 Finally, the court determined that the investigative stop, which included several steps and protective measures, was reasonably related to the original grounds for
stopping the vehicle and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.130
The use of handcuffs by police officers to effectuate a Terry stop may
be reasonable in certain circumstances.131 Law enforcement officials are
also allowed to continue the detention for as long as reasonably necessary
to eliminate their initial suspicions.132 Whether these same procedures also

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 812-13.
123. Id. at 814.
124. Id. (citing United States v. Palomino, 100 F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 1996)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 815.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993)).
130. Id.
131. See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that an officer’s
use of handcuffs was reasonable in conducting a Terry stop).
132. See Houston, 174 F.3d at 814-15 (stating that the duration of the stop must be reasonably related to the grounds for the initial stop).
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apply to vehicle passengers is important to understanding the Fourth
Amendment framework.133
C. SEIZURES AND PAT-DOWN SEARCHES AS APPLIED TO VEHICLE
PASSENGERS IN NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognizes three tiers of law enforcement-citizen encounters: (1) arrests, which require probable cause; (2)
reasonable suspicion stops, which are seizures requiring a reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) community caretaking encounters, which do not constitute Fourth Amendment seizures.134 In State
v. Boline,135 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a seizure occurs
when officers, by use of physical force or show of authority, have in some
way restrained a person’s liberty.136 Later, the court decided that the same
standard is appropriate in determining whether an officer seized a passenger
of a vehicle.137
1. Seizure of Vehicle Passenger Not Suspected of Wrongful or
Criminal Conduct
In State v. Heitzmann,138 police officers stopped a vehicle, in which
Heitzmann was a passenger, because the driver operated the vehicle with a
suspended driver’s license.139 An officer addressed Heitzmann, who appeared nervous, and informed Heitzmann that the driver was under arrest.140
The officer told Heitzmann that the vehicle would be searched, and asked
133. See discussion infra Part II.C (analyzing whether seizures and pat-down searches of vehicle passengers that are not suspected of any wrongdoing are also reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment).
134. State v. Boline, 1998 ND 67, ¶ 24, 575 N.W.2d 906, 909 (citing State v. Halfmann, 518
N.W.2d 729, 730 (N.D. 1994)).
135. 1998 ND 67, 575 N.W.2d 906.
136. Boline, ¶ 25, 575 N.W.2d at 909 (quoting Halfmann, 518 N.W.2d at 731). An officer
seized the defendant when he asked the defendant to step outside a service station and into the officer’s patrol car. Id. At the time of Boline’s seizure, the police were investigating an alleged domestic violence crime. Id. ¶ 27, 575 N.W.2d at 909-10. After an officer witnessed Boline driving,
the officer approached Boline regarding the domestic violence allegations and the scent of alcohol. Id. ¶ 14, 575 N.W.2d at 908. The officer questioned Boline about the allegations, asked him
if he had been drinking, administered field sobriety tests, and placed Boline under arrest for driving while impaired. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. The court viewed the defendant’s presence in the patrol car as a
momentary restraint of freedom indicative of a Terry stop. Id. ¶ 27, 575 N.W.2d at 910. Therefore, the defendant was initially seized, but not formally arrested. Id. ¶ 26, 575 N.W.2d at 909.
137. State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, ¶¶ 9-10, 632 N.W.2d 1, 6.
138. 2001 ND 136, 632 N.W.2d 1.
139. Heitzmann, ¶ 2, 632 N.W.2d at 4. Police arrested the driver and informed him that the
vehicle would be searched. Id. A deputy told the officer that Heitzmann was on probation. Id.
The deputy also told the officer that law enforcement had information that Heiztmann received a
recent shipment of methamphetamine. Id.
140. Id. ¶ 3, 632 N.W.2d at 5.
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Heitzmann to exit the vehicle.141 The police officer then frisked Heitzmann.142 The officer felt a bag of “crushed substance” in Heitzmann’s
pants pocket and asked Heitzmann to remove the contents, after which the
defendant attempted to break free.143 The officer removed a sum of money
from Heitzmann’s jacket.144 While the officer restrained Heitzmann by
holding onto Heitzmann’s jacket, Heitzmann pulled his arm out of his jacket and ran.145 The officers took the defendant down to the ground and
handcuffed him.146 Heitzmann then yelled that there was “crank” in his
wallet.147 Officers found methamphetamine and a razor blade in Heitzmann’s wallet.148 He was charged with felony possession of a controlled
substance.149 Heitzmann did not contest the investigative stop of the vehicle, the driver’s arrest, or the officers’ right to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle.150 He did, however, argue that the pat-down search
of his person violated his Fourth Amendment rights.151
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that a passenger’s Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated when police officers asked the passenger to exit the vehicle so that the officers could search the vehicle incident
to the driver’s arrest.152 The court cited State v. Gilberts153 in upholding the
removal of Heitzmann from the vehicle.154 In Gilberts, the court acknowledged two grounds that validate a passenger’s removal from a vehicle and
make a brief search of the passenger both reasonable and permissible under
the Fourth Amendment.155 The first basis was officer safety.156 The court
stated that the interest in officer safety outweighed the minor intrusion on a
passenger’s liberty.157 The second basis was that law enforcement officials
141. Id.
142. Id. The officer told Heitzmann that the search was for “the safety of both Heitzmann
and the officer.” Id.
143. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
144. Id. ¶ 5.
145. Id.
146. Id. Heitzmann’s arm was broken in the scuffle and the officers had to call for an ambulance. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. ¶ 6.
150. Id. ¶10, 632 N.W.2d at 6.
151. Id. ¶ 7, 632 N.W.2d at 5.
152. Id. ¶ 10, 632 N.W.2d at 6.
153. 497 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1993).
154. Heitzmann, ¶ 10, 632 N.W.2d at 6.
155. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 96. The court stated that a reasonableness determination requires balancing the public interest with the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary intrusion
by law enforcement officers. Id. at 95.
156. Id. (citing State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890-91 (Minn. 1978)).
157. Id.
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are allowed to search the passenger compartment incident to a driver’s lawful arrest.158 Police officers are allowed to remove vehicle passengers in
order to conduct a safe and thorough search of the vehicle.159 A seizure of a
vehicle passenger does not, however, automatically justify a search of the
passenger.160
2. Search of Vehicle Passenger Not Suspected of Wrongful or
Criminal Conduct
The North Dakota Supreme Court then turned to Heitzmann’s search
and stated that there is no automatic search rule for vehicle passengers.161
A search occurs when the government interferes with a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.162 The Fourth Amendment allows police to require
a passenger not suspected of committing a crime to exit a vehicle so that
police can conduct a search of the vehicle.163 However, a frisk of the passenger requires a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the passenger is
armed and dangerous.164
In Heitzmann, the court concluded that law enforcement had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant could have been armed and
dangerous; therefore, the frisk was warranted.165 The court analyzed the
facts surrounding the frisk using the totality of the circumstances approach.166 The officers believed that the defendant had earlier received a
shipment of methamphetamine.167 The defendant appeared nervous when
approached by police.168 A deputy warned the officer conducting the
search to be cautious of the defendant.169 Most importantly, the officer
knew that an unloaded pistol was in the vehicle because the driver previ-

158. Id.
159. Id. (citing United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1985)).
160. See State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, ¶ 11, 632 N.W.2d at 7 (recognizing that there is
no automatic search rule for vehicle passengers).
161. Id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 92-96 (1979)).
162. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. Dunn,
2002 ND 189, ¶ 4, 653 N.W.2d 688, 690 (citing State v. Winkler, 552 N.W.2d 347, 351 (N.D.
1996)).
163. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 96.
164. Heitzmann, ¶ 11, 632 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting State v. Haverluk, 2000 ND 178, ¶ 22, 617
N.W.2d 652, 657); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that limited frisk
searches are permitted and defining the reasonable suspicion standard).
165. Heitzmann, ¶ 12, 632 N.W.2d at 8.
166. Id. at 7 n.1 (citing Geiger v. Backes, 444 N.W.2d 692, 693 (N.D. 1989)).
167. Id. ¶ 12.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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ously told the officer.170 The court concluded that these facts amounted to
reasonable suspicion and justified the officer’s frisk of Heitzmann.171
The court also concluded that the officer acted reasonably in asking the
defendant to remove the contents of his pockets because the officer reasonably believed the protrusion might be a weapon.172 Thus, when a patdown search reveals an object that an officer reasonably believes might be a
weapon, the officer may search the inner garments in order to determine
whether the object is a weapon.173 In addition, Heitzmann’s evasion of the
search triggered “extenuating circumstances” for a more intrusive search.174
The court recognized that a more intrusive Terry search may be permitted
under the Fourth Amendment if the detained person attempts to prevent an
officer from performing a frisk.175 Threatening conduct by a detainee during a frisk entitles law enforcement officials to act reasonably to protect
themselves.176 Here, the defendant’s attempt to avoid the frisk, his resistance during the search, and his nervousness led the court to conclude that
the more intrusive search was reasonable.177
Finally, the court examined whether the confrontation between the defendant and police constituted an unlawful arrest not supported by probable
cause.178 While there is no bright-line rule for when an investigative stop
becomes a de facto arrest, the length of the interaction is an important factor
in determining whether a seizure is justified on reasonable suspicion.179
Other factors include the underlying purposes for the stop, the reasonable
amount of time needed to effectuate those purposes, the severity of the
crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to safety, and whether
the suspect is resisting or evading the seizure.180 In Heitzmann, the detention was brief, the defendant was detained to effectuate a search upon a vehicle incident to the driver’s arrest, and the defendant attempted to escape
from police.181 Therefore, the detention amounted to a lawful arrest.182
170. Id.
171. Id. at 8.
172. Id. ¶ 14.
173. Id. ¶ 13 (citing State v. Zearley, 468 N.W.2d 391, 392 (N.D. 1991)).
174. Id. ¶ 17, 632 N.W.2d at 10.
175. Id. ¶ 16, 632 N.W.2d at 9.
176. Id. (citing Thomas v. State, 498 S.E.2d 760, 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)).
177. Id. ¶ 17, 632 N.W.2d at 10.
178. Id. ¶ 18. Law enforcement is allowed to use some degree of force to achieve the investigation’s purpose, maintain the status quo, and promote officer safety. Id. (citing Rhodes v. State,
945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
179. Id. (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)).
180. Id.
181. Id. ¶ 19, 632 N.W.2d at 10-11.
182. Id. at 11.

2009]

CASE COMMENT

231

In North Dakota, passengers can be removed from a vehicle so that officers can conduct a lawful search of the vehicle.183 To search the passenger, officers must have reasonable suspicion the passenger is armed and
dangerous.184 In addition to analyzing the Fourth Amendment rights of a
vehicle passenger, the North Dakota Supreme Court has examined whether
probationers enjoy these same protections.185
D. LIMITATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UPON
PROBATIONERS
In 1972, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights are limited because of their status as a
probationer.186 Thirty-two years later, the court decided State v. Krous187
and held that certain probationary conditions, if accepted by the probationer, constitute consent to reasonable warrantless searches.188 In Krous,
the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment, followed by probation, for
controlled substance violations.189 Police officers went to the defendant’s
home and conducted a probation search after the defendant neither reported
nor responded to her probation officer.190 The State moved to revoke the
defendant’s probation based on drugs and drug paraphernalia discovered
during the search.191 The defendant moved to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia.192 Krous argued that the word “submit” in her conditions of probation required officers to ask permission prior to conducting a search.193
Krous contended that if she then opposed the search, her probation could be
revoked.194
The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the district court’s denial of
the suppression motion.195 The North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted
183. Id. ¶ 10, 632 N.W.2d at 7.
184. Id. ¶ 12, 632 N.W.2d at 8.
185. See discussion infra Part II.D (discussing the limitations that may be placed on a probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights).
186. State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136, 139 (N.D. 1972).
187. 2004 ND 136, 681 N.W.2d 822.
188. Krous, ¶ 19, 681 N.W.2d at 827. The probation condition at issue was as follows:
“Condition (2)(h) Defendant shall submit to search of her person, vehicle, or place of residence by
any probation officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant.” Id. ¶ 2,
681 N.W.2d at 824.
189. Id. ¶ 2. The probation conditions subjected Krous to warrantless searches. Id.
190. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Krous was also seen associating with a known drug user. Id. ¶ 3. Officers
did not seek permission to search the defendant’s residence. Id. ¶ 4.
191. Id. ¶ 5.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. ¶ 23, 681 N.W.2d at 827.
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the terms of the defendant’s probation and determined that the word “submit” included future consent to reasonable searches, which do not require
officers to seek consent at the time of the search.196 The court rejected the
defendant’s request to interpret the word “submit” to allow the probationer
to resist a search.197 The court also declared that probationers enjoy limited
rights under the Fourth Amendment.198 The North Dakota Supreme Court
concluded that the judiciary has a duty to monitor a probationer’s activities
to aid in the rehabilitation process.199 Allowing a probationer to oppose a
search defeats the purposes of probation conditions employed to prevent
further wrongdoing by the probationer.200
While probation searches may be considered reasonable under certain
probation conditions, the searches must not be conducted in an unreasonable manner.201 Probation conditions do not justify infringement upon the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.202 The United States Supreme Court has also examined whether affording an unlawfully seized individual with the Fifth Amendment’s Miranda protections justifies infringement upon the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.203
E. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FOURTH AND FIFTH
AMENDMENTS
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “No
person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”204 The Miranda warnings are procedural safeguards that protect
196. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19, 681 N.W.2d at 826, 827. Probation searches are derived from North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-32-07, which provides:
When imposing a sentence to probation, probation in conjunction with imprisonment,
or probation in conjunction with suspended execution or deferred imposition of sentence, the court may impose such conditions as it deems appropriate, and may include
any one or more of the following: . . . (n) Submit the defendant’s person, place of residence, or vehicle to search and seizure by a probation officer at any time of the day or
night, with or without a search warrant.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07(4) (Supp. 2007).
197. Krous, ¶ 15, 681 N.W.2d at 826. Krous argued that the court should adopt Oregon authority which states that a probationer may resist a search, but then the probationer risks having
his or her probationary status revoked. Id. (citing State v. Gulley, 921 P.2d 396, 398 (Or. 1996)).
Oregon courts also hold that a probationer’s consent to reasonable searches is not prospective and
must be given before a search is conducted. Id. (citing Gulley, 921 P.2d at 398).
198. Id. ¶ 16 (citing State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136, 139 (N.D. 1972)).
199. Id. (citing Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d at 139).
200. Id. ¶ 18, 681 N.W.2d at 827.
201. Id. ¶ 21.
202. Id.
203. See discussion infra Part II.E (examining whether the Miranda warnings are sufficient
to dissipate the taint of an unlawful arrest).
204. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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an individual’s right to be free from coercive self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment.205 Under certain conditions, Miranda allows exclusion
of incriminating statements made in the absence of warnings.206 The warnings are meant to deter law enforcement officials from obtaining incriminating statements without first informing the declarant of his or her Fifth
Amendment rights.207
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the effect of administering Miranda warnings to an individual following a Fourth
Amendment violation.208 In Brown v. Illinois,209 the Court declared that
Miranda warnings are not a means of remedying or deterring Fourth
Amendment violations even though, ninety years prior, the Court recognized the “intimate relation” between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.210
While the Amendments are interrelated, application of the exclusionary rule
under the Fourth Amendment protects different interests than those protected under the Fifth Amendment.211 The Fourth Amendment applies to
all unlawful searches and seizures, regardless of whether any incriminating
evidence is discovered.212 The Fifth Amendment, however, may only require exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings.213 The
exclusion of an unwarned confession under the Fifth Amendment does not
fully protect Fourth Amendment rights.214 According to the Court, Miranda warnings alone do not sufficiently deter Fourth Amendment violations.215
In Brown, officers investigating a murder received information that
Brown was an acquaintance of the victim.216 Two officers entered Brown’s
apartment, searched the residence, and arrested Brown when he returned
home.217 The officers acted without probable cause or an arrest warrant.218
205. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966).
206. Id. at 458.
207. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-01 (1975) (stating that the Miranda warnings
deter the taking of incriminating statements without first advising an individual of his or her Fifth
Amendment rights).
208. See id. at 603 (holding that Miranda warnings do not per se attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest).
209. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
210. Brown, 422 U.S. at 601 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886)) (observing the relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 592.
217. Id. The officers held Brown at gunpoint, ordered him to stand against the wall,
searched him, and arrested him for murder. Id. at 593. On the way to the police station, Brown
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The two officers informed Brown of his Miranda rights, and questioned
Brown for about twenty-five minutes.219 Brown’s signed statement provided that on the evening prior to the murder, he and another man, Jimmy
Claggett, visited the victim.220 Brown admitted that the men drank alcohol
and smoked marijuana.221 Brown stated that Claggett ordered Brown to
bind the victim with a cord.222 According to Brown, Claggett then shot the
victim three times.223
Several hours later, an Assistant State’s Attorney informed Brown of
his Miranda rights.224 The Assistant State’s Attorney told Brown that he
would be charged with murder and Brown gave a second statement with a
factual account of the murder.225 Brown subsequently refused to sign this
statement.226 Both Brown and Claggett were indicted for the murder.227
Brown moved to suppress his two statements, alleging that his arrest and
detention were unconstitutional.228 The motion was denied, and Brown was
found guilty.229 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.230 The Court concluded that Brown’s arrest was unlawful, but held
that the administration of Miranda warnings broke the causal chain between
the unlawful arrest and the statements.231 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and rejected the Illinois Supreme Court’s per se rule.232
The Court first declared that even if the defendant’s statements were
voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue remained.233 The Court cited to Wong Sun and stated that the admissibility of
the statements must also be analyzed under Fourth Amendment policies and
interests.234 To declare Miranda warnings sufficient to rectify an unconsti-

evaded police questioning. Id. at 593-94. Police placed Brown in an interrogation room upon arrival at the station. Id. at 594.
218. Id. at 592.
219. Id. at 594.
220. Id. at 594-95.
221. Id. at 595.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 596.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. At trial the State elicited testimony regarding Brown’s two statements, but the first
statement was not placed into evidence. Id. The second statement was read to the jury in full. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 596-97.
232. Id. at 597, 603.
233. Id. at 601-02.
234. Id. at 602.
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tutional arrest would curtail the exclusionary rule and remove the incentive
to avoid constitutional violations.235 The Miranda warnings would essentially become a “cure-all,” reducing the Fourth Amendment protections to a
form of words.236 Instead, the Court devised four factors to determine
whether Miranda warnings break the causal connection between unconstitutional arrests and confessions.237 The four attenuation factors included:
(1) whether Miranda warnings were administered; (2) the temporal proximity between the arrest and the confession; (3) the presence of intervening
circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy behind the unlawful arrest
or misconduct.238
The Court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of showing
Brown’s statements were admissible under Wong Sun.239 The Court also
declined to overrule Wong Sun, which the Court stated must be done for the
first statement to be admissible.240 Thus, Brown’s second statement was a
“fruit” of the first statement and was inadmissible.241 The Court acknowledged that the officers’ unlawful search for evidence was intentional, but
the Court limited its holding to the error made by the Illinois courts in determining that Miranda warnings remedy an unlawful arrest.242
Twenty-six years after Brown, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the four-prong Brown test to determine whether Miranda warnings
were sufficient to rectify Fourth Amendment violations.243 In United States
v. Reinholz,244 police officers investigated the defendant for purchasing thirty grams of iodine crystals, which are used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine, from pharmaceutical stores.245 Officers obtained and executed a search warrant on Reinholz and his residence.246 Prior to the police
search of his residence, and without Miranda warnings, Reinholz told an
officer that drug paraphernalia would be found and that the paraphernalia
belonged to Reinholz.247 Officers then informed Reinholz of his Miranda
235. Id.
236. Id. at 602-03 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)).
237. Id. at 603-04.
238. Id. The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold determination. Id. at 604.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 604-05.
241. Id. at 605.
242. Id.
243. United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 779 (8th Cir. 2001).
244. 245 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 2001).
245. Reinholz, 245 F.3d at 770.
246. Id. at 771. Police officers apprehended Reinholz, searched him, handcuffed him, and
drove to his residence. Id. The officers informed Reinholz that his residence would be searched,
and then Reinholz made the admission. Id.
247. Id.
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rights.248 Reinholz waived his rights, and repeated his admission.249 Law
enforcement officers found drugs in the garage, and Reinholz admitted to
manufacturing methamphetamine.250 He was thereafter indicted on several
drug charges and filed a motion to suppress the evidence on several
grounds, including unlawful arrest.251 The district court granted the motion,
holding that Reinholz was unlawfully arrested and that no causal break existed between the arrest and the statements Reinholz made to police.252
The Eighth Circuit cited Brown and recognized that unlawfully obtained statements must be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment and must
not be the result of an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment to be
admissible.253 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals listed four attenuation
factors for determination: (1) whether Miranda warnings were administered
to the suspect prior to the statement; (2) the temporal proximity of the
statements to the unlawful seizure; (3) the existence of intervening causes
between the unlawful arrest and the statements; and (4) the purpose or flagrancy of the police misconduct.254 The court held that the defendant’s
statements were all inadmissible due to his unconstitutional arrest.255
Recitation of the Miranda warnings does not serve as a “cure-all” to
Fourth Amendment violations.256 Rather, the attenuation determination is a
matter of degree, which depends upon the facts of each case.257 The factors
derived from Brown offer guidance in determining whether statements obtained following an unlawful detention are attenuated enough to cure the
unlawful police activity.258 In North Dakota, if a district court orders the
unlawfully obtained statements suppressed, and the prosecutor appeals, the
appeal must meet certain statutory requirements.259

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 772.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 779.
253. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975)).
254. Id. (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04).
255. Id. at 780.
256. Brown, 422 U.S. at 602 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)).
257. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring); see also 6 LAFAVE, supra note 40, at 259 (recognizing that the test of attenuation depends on the particular facts of each case).
258. See 6 LAFAVE, supra note 40, at 260 (stating that there is no bright-line test for determining whether there is an attenuation between a Fourth Amendment violation and evidence derived therefrom).
259. See City of Harvey v. Fettig, 2001 ND 12, ¶ 5, 621 N.W.2d 324, 325 (stating that the
prosecution’s right to appeal is limited by statute).
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F. PROSECUTION’S STATUTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL IN NORTH
DAKOTA
In North Dakota, a prosecutor’s right to appeal in a criminal case is limited by statute.260 In City of Harvey v. Fettig,261 the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from an order granting the defendant’s
motion to suppress, because a statement by the prosecutor, as required by
North Dakota Century Code section 29-28-07(5), did not accompany the
appeal.262 The purpose of the statute is to ensure that the prosecutor diligently evaluates the case and the effect of the suppression order, prior to filing the notice of appeal.263
In Fettig, a police officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle for a headlight violation.264 The driver fled the scene, and law enforcement towed the
vehicle to Harvey City Hall.265 Law enforcement officers then conducted a
warrantless search of the vehicle.266 The officers found alcoholic beverages, the defendant’s wallet, and the defendant’s driver’s license in the vehicle.267 An officer visited Fettig’s home and questioned him regarding the
incident.268 Fettig admitted to being the driver and having beer in the vehicle.269 The trial court held that the warrantless search of the vehicle was a
violation of Fettig’s right to be free from unreasonable searches under the
Fourth Amendment.270 The City of Harvey filed an interlocutory appeal after the trial court suppressed statements made by Fettig and the evidence
that alcohol was found in his vehicle.271

260. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07(5) (2006). The section provides:
An appeal may be taken by the state from: . . . (5) An order granting the return of
property or suppressing evidence, or suppressing a confession or admission, when accompanied by a statement of the prosecuting attorney asserting that the appeal is not
taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. The statement must be filed with the clerk of district court and
a copy must accompany the notice of appeal.
Id. An argument premised on the prosecution’s failure to properly appeal will not always arise,
but in Gay the defendant argued and the court addressed the issue. Brief for Appellee, supra note
5, ¶ 14; State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d 408, 412.
261. 2001 ND 12, 621 N.W.2d 324.
262. Fettig, ¶ 1, 621 N.W.2d at 325.
263. Id. ¶ 6 (citing State v. Norton, 2000 ND 153, ¶ 5, 615 N.W.2d 531, 533).
264. Id. ¶ 2.
265. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
266. Id. ¶ 3.
267. Id. Fettig was also the registered owner of the vehicle. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. Fettig was charged with minor in possession, open container, fleeing an officer, care
required, and a parking violation. Id. ¶ 4.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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The prosecuting attorney filed an affidavit with the notice of appeal
and other documents, but the documents did not mention the statute or the
statutorily required statement.272 The affidavit was void of any language
that indicated the appeal was not taken for purposes of delay.273 The document also failed to explain the relevance and importance of the suppressed
evidence.274 Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal proclaiming that the
statement “must have substance” and cannot merely paraphrase the statutory language.275 The court emphasized that prosecutors must supplement
their appeals with a description of the relevance of the suppressed evidence.276 The appeal will not proceed unless the court is satisfied with the
prosecutor’s statement.277 The North Dakota Supreme Court applied this
analysis to State v. Gay278 in 2008.279
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Kapsner wrote for the majority in Gay, joined by Chief Justice
VandeWalle and Justice Crothers.280 The majority allowed the State’s appeal to proceed and ultimately adopted the four-prong test derived from
Brown to determine whether Miranda warnings are sufficient to dissipate
the taint of an unreasonable seizure.281 Justice Sandstrom dissented and
was joined by Justice Maring.282
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The first issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was whether
the State’s appeal was properly taken in the case.283 The court allowed the
appeal to proceed, because the State referenced the relevant statute, addressed both prongs of the statute, and the suppressed evidence was clearly
pertinent to the prosecution.284 The second issue was whether the trial court
erred in suppressing the defendant’s statements.285 The court held that the

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. ¶ 7, 621 N.W.2d at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 1, 6, 621 N.W.2d at 325.
Id. ¶ 6, 621 N.W.2d at 325.
Id.
2008 ND 84, 748 N.W.2d 408.
See discussion infra Part III (providing analysis of the opinion in State v. Gay).
Gay, ¶¶ 1, 26, 748 N.W.2d at 411, 417.
Id. ¶¶ 10, 23-24, 748 N.W.2d at 413, 417.
Id. ¶ 34, 748 N.W.2d at 420 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d at 412.
Id. ¶ 10, 748 N.W.2d at 413.
Id. ¶ 11.
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stop and search of the vehicle in which Gay rode as a passenger was constitutional.286 The court, however, upheld the suppression of Gay’s statements, because his continued seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.287
Finally, the court addressed whether Miranda warnings cure a Fourth
Amendment violation.288 The court applied the factors from Brown to
Gay’s case and concluded that the suppression order was proper.289
1.

Proper Appeal by the State

Gay argued that the prosecution did not properly appeal from the suppression order.290 The court permitted the prosecution’s appeal pursuant to
North Dakota Century Code section 29-28-07(5).291 The court distinguished Gay from Fettig and determined that the prosecution adequately referenced both prongs of the statute.292 The court found that although the
State failed to describe the relevance and necessity of the suppressed evidence, the facts alone demonstrated the importance of the statements.293
The statements were the only evidence indicating that Gay ingested a controlled substance.294 The relevance of this evidence was apparent, so the
court did not require an explanation.295 The appeal proceeded and the court
next examined the suppression of Gay’s statements regarding the use of marijuana.296
2.

Suppression of the Statements

The court reviewed the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress
evidence.297 The North Dakota Supreme Court, when reviewing a suppression order, defers to the trial court’s findings of fact and resolves evidentiary conflicts in favor of affirmance.298 The court addressed: (1) the stop
and search of the vehicle in which Gay rode; (2) the pat-down search conducted upon Gay; and (3) whether the police conduct following the pat-

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 18, 748 N.W.2d at 415.
Id. ¶ 21, 748 N.W.2d at 416.
Id. ¶ 24, 748 N.W.2d at 417.
Id. ¶ 8, 748 N.W.2d at 412.
Id. ¶ 10, 748 N.W.2d at 413 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07(5) (2006)).
Id. ¶¶ 9-10 (citing City of Harvey v. Fettig, 2001 ND 12, ¶¶ 7-8, 621 N.W.2d 324, 326).
Id. ¶ 10 (citing Fettig, ¶ 8, 621 N.W.2d at 326).
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Guscette, 2004 ND 71, ¶ 5, 678 N.W.2d 126, 128).
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down search was constitutional.299 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the suppression order because Deputy Kvande’s testimony and police reports supported the trial court’s factual conclusions.300
a.

Stop and search of the vehicle

The court held that the stop and search of the vehicle in which Gay was
a passenger posed no constitutional problem.301 Gay rode with Smith, a
probationer with limited Fourth Amendment rights.302 The officers stopped
Smith’s vehicle to conduct a probation search.303 The court relied on Krous
to state that officers did not need probable cause or reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to render the stop and search of the vehicle constitutional
since the premise of the stop was a probation search of Smith’s vehicle.304
The search of the vehicle alone, however, did not justify a search of the passenger.305
b.

The pat-down search of Gay

The State argued that the initial pat-down search of the defendant was
constitutional because law enforcement based the search on officer safety.306 First, the court provided the applicable North Dakota and federal
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.307 The court derived the definition of a
“seizure” from both Heitzmann and Boline.308 The court then acknowledged the proper standard for determining the reasonableness of a seizure
under North Dakota law.309 The public interest in safety must be balanced
with the person’s right to be free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement.310 Lastly, the court defined a “search.”311 A search occurs
when law enforcement intrudes upon a person’s “reasonable expectation of
299. Id. ¶¶ 12, 16, 17, 748 N.W.2d at 413-15.
300. Id. ¶ 20, 748 N.W.2d at 416.
301. Id. ¶ 12, 748 N.W.2d at 413.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. (citing State v. Krous, 2004 ND 136, ¶ 19, 681 N.W.2d 822, 827).
305. Id. ¶ 16, 748 N.W.2d at 414 (citing State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, ¶¶ 10-11, 632
N.W.2d 1, 6-7).
306. Id. ¶ 13, 748 N.W.2d at 413.
307. Id. ¶ 14, 748 N.W.2d at 414.
308. Id. (citing Heitzmann, ¶ 9, 632 N.W.2d at 6; State v. Boline, 1998 ND 67, ¶ 26, 575
N.W.2d 906, 909). A seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer stops an individual and restrains the individual’s freedom. Id. (citing Heitzmann, ¶ 9, 632 N.W.2d at 6). The officer must
restrain a person’s liberty in order for a seizure to occur. Id. (citing Boline, ¶ 25, 575 N.W.2d at
909).
309. Id.
310. Id. (citing Heitzmann, ¶ 9, 632 N.W.2d at 6).
311. Id.
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privacy.”312 Relying upon the United States and North Dakota Constitutions, the court emphasized that searches, like seizures, must be reasonable.313
The court then examined the removal of Gay from the vehicle.314 The
court analyzed Heitzmann to determine whether Gay’s removal from the
vehicle was constitutionally permissible.315 The court determined that removing a passenger for officers to conduct a search of the vehicle was reasonable.316 The same is true even if the passenger did not commit a traffic
violation and is not suspected of criminal activity.317 The court recognized,
however, that there is no “automatic search rule” that allows law enforcement to search persons associated with an arrested individual.318 Instead,
the court proclaimed that an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that a
person, including a passenger, is armed and dangerous to conduct a patdown search.319
Finally, the court quoted Terry in recognizing the prerequisites and the
limited purposes underlying a pat-down search.320 The North Dakota Supreme Court deferred to the district court’s factual findings on the initial
pat-down search and handcuffing of Gay.321 The court upheld the district
court’s conclusion, based on Deputy Kvande’s testimony, that these actions
were constitutional because of the officers’ safety concerns.322 The court
then examined the police conduct following the initial pat-down search to
determine whether it was constitutionally permissible.323
c.

The prolonged detention

The district court concluded that the police conduct following the initial search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.324 Relying on

312. Id. (citing State v. Dunn, 2002 ND 189, ¶ 4, 653 N.W.2d 688, 690).
313. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV and N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8).
314. Id. ¶ 16, 748 N.W.2d at 414-15.
315. Id. (citing Heitzmann, ¶¶ 10-11, 632 N.W.2d at 6-7).
316. Id. at 414.
317. Id.
318. Id. ¶ 15 (citing Heitzmann, ¶ 11, 632 N.W.2d at 7).
319. Id.
320. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). Law enforcement must be allowed to
conduct a search for weapons in order to protect officer safety. Id. The standard is “whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that
of others was in danger.” Id.
321. Id. ¶¶ 16, 20, 748 N.W.2d at 415, 416.
322. Id. ¶ 16, 748 N.W.2d at 415.
323. Id. ¶ 17.
324. Id. The State argued that the detention of Gay “lasted no longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop and that the officers used the least intrusive means avail-
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Heitzmann, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a frisk is not a precursor to conducting a more exhaustive search.325 Here, the court recognized that law enforcements’ use of handcuffs restrained Gay’s liberty.326
The officers’ use of handcuffs on the defendant consequently amounted to a
seizure under Boline.327 The seizure, however, continued after police determined Gay was not a threat to officer safety.328
The court noted that officers may use forcible means to effectuate the
investigation, maintain the status quo, or promote officer safety, as long as
the means are reasonable.329 Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court
agreed with the district court’s finding that after law enforcement frisked
Gay, searched Smith, and searched Smith’s car, Gay’s continued seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights.330 The court held that the Fourth
Amendment violation warranted application of the exclusionary rule.331
The court concluded by reviewing the facts of the case.332 Deputy
Kvande arrived at the scene after officers handcuffed, frisked, and informed
Gay of his Miranda rights.333 Kvande then searched Gay a second time, left
him handcuffed, re-read Gay his Miranda rights, and questioned Gay about
his involvement with Smith.334 The questioning led to Gay’s admission to
smoking marijuana the previous day.335 The court deferred to the factual
findings of the district court and held that Gay’s statements were made during an unlawful seizure, which warranted application of the exclusionary
rule under Wong Sun.336
3.

Adoption of the Four-Prong Attenuation Test

Finally, the court examined whether Miranda warnings, which guard
against Fifth Amendment violations, are adequate to attenuate the taint of
able to dispel their suspicion in a timely fashion.” Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, ¶ 28 (citing
United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001)).
325. Gay, ¶ 16, 748 N.W.2d at 414 (citing State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, ¶ 13, 632
N.W.2d 1, 8).
326. Id. ¶ 17.
327. Id. (citing State v. Boline, 1998 ND 67, ¶ 25, 575 N.W.2d 906, 909).
328. Id. A police officer may detain an individual for as long as reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose for the confinement. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. ¶ 18. None of these searches uncovered any evidence of weapons. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. ¶ 19, 748 N.W.2d at 415-16.
333. Id. at 415.
334. Id. at 415-16.
335. Id. at 416.
336. Id. ¶¶ 18-20, 748 N.W.2d at 415-16 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
484-88 (1963) (holding that verbal statements may be deemed inadmissible if obtained by methods prohibited by the Fourth Amendment)).
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an unreasonable seizure, making unlawfully obtained statements admissible.337 The district court concluded that reciting Miranda warnings did not
attenuate the taint of the Fourth Amendment violation.338 Because the district court addressed the overlap of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in suppressing the statements.339
The court quoted the United States Supreme Court’s rationale from
Brown, and stated that the impact of the exclusionary rule would be weakened if Miranda warnings alone were enough to cure an unconstitutional
arrest.340 Recognizing that the United States Supreme Court first devised
the test used to determine whether Miranda warnings are sufficient to cure
Fourth Amendment violations, the court chose to adopt the precise language
used by the Eighth Circuit in Reinholz.341 Applying the Reinholz factors in
Gay, the court again concluded that the district court properly suppressed
Gay’s statements.342
The court first found that the officers informed Gay of his Miranda
rights, which weighed against the suppression of his statements under the
first factor.343 Next, the court noted that Gay’s statements occurred during
the unlawful activity, which meant that the temporal proximity of the
statements to the unlawful detention weighed in favor of suppression under
the second factor.344 Finally, the court adopted the district court’s conclusion that the purpose of Gay’s detention was to protect officer safety.345
Law enforcement, however, detained Gay with handcuffs for approximately
fifteen minutes.346 The officers did not release Gay after they dispelled the
issue of officer safety.347 Therefore, the court accepted the district court’s
findings that the Miranda warnings did not rectify the Fourth Amendment
337. Id. ¶ 21, 748 N.W.2d at 416. Neither party raised the issue on appeal, but the court addressed the issue because the trial court discussed the intersection between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1975)).
341. Id. ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d at 417. The Reinholz factors are: “(1) whether the suspect has
been advised of his Miranda rights prior to giving his statement; (2) the temporal proximity of his
statements to his illegal seizure; (3) the existence of intervening causes between the illegal arrest
and the statements; and (4) the purpose or flagrancy of the official misconduct.” United States v.
Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 779 (8th Cir. 2001).
342. Gay, ¶ 24, 748 N.W.2d at 417.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. The court did not analyze the third factor, because the district court did not discuss
any intervening causes that may have dissipated the taint of the unlawful seizure. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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violation.348 The majority held that the evidence supported these factual
and legal conclusions, and affirmed the suppression order.349 Justice Sandstrom, joined by Justice Maring, disagreed with the majority’s decision.350
B. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Sandstrom opined that law enforcement acted reasonably and
that the district court misapplied the law.351 First, he stated that similar detentions, which lasted longer than Gay’s, have been recognized as reasonable.352 He equated Gay’s confinement to the detention in Houston, a civil
rights suit.353 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals deemed the investigative
stop reasonable where law enforcement kept the two vehicle occupants
handcuffed for thirty-five to sixty minutes after they had been frisked.354
Next, Justice Sandstrom stressed that the use of handcuffs to effectuate
investigatory stops is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.355 He noted
that there was no evidence that the use of handcuffs coerced Gay into making the incriminating statements.356 Justice Sandstrom recognized that law
enforcement informed Gay of his Miranda rights on two separate occasions.357 Gay then chose to make the incriminating statements.358 Justice
Sandstrom also argued that the district court’s conclusion that the use of
handcuffs after officers frisked Gay was unreasonable has been rejected in
several jurisdictions.359
Finally, Justice Sandstrom determined that the actions of law enforcement were reasonable under the circumstances because Gay may still have

348. Id.
349. Id. ¶¶ 24, 25.
350. Id. ¶¶ 33, 34, 748 N.W.2d at 420 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
351. Id. ¶ 28, 748 N.W.2d at 417.
352. Id. ¶ 30, 748 N.W.2d at 418.
353. Id. (citing Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 815
(6th Cir. 1999)). Houston was a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than an appeal from a
suppression order as in Gay. Houston, 174 F.3d at 811. The plaintiffs alleged that officers violated their Fourth Amendment by handcuffing and detaining two suspects while police investigated an alleged shooting. Id. at 811-12.
354. Gay, ¶ 30, 748 N.W.2d at 418 (citing Houston, 174 F.3d at 815).
355. Id. ¶ 31, 748 N.W.2d at 418-20.
356. Id. ¶ 28, 748 N.W.2d at 417.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. ¶ 31, 748 N.W.2d at 418-19 (citing United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 791 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir.
1983); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1982); People v. Soun, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 822, 831-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 1999);
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (Va. Ct. App. 1993)).
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posed a danger to law enforcement.360 Justice Sandstrom stated that the officers acted reasonably because the absence of a weapon from Gay’s person
may not have relieved the officers’ safety concerns.361 Justice Sandstrom
referred to the fact that Gay could have obtained a weapon from the two unsearched vehicles that were at the scene.362 He also recognized that the defendant could have accessed a weapon from a nearby building.363 Justice
Sandstrom argued that the officers’ actions were reasonable with regard to
officer safety.364 For these reasons, and because the majority opinion “unreasonably imperil[ed] officer safety,” Justice Sandstrom would have reversed and remanded for trial.365
IV. IMPACT
The essential impact of Gay is that the North Dakota Supreme Court
rejected a per se, or “but for,” rule that Miranda warnings are sufficient to
dissipate a Fourth Amendment violation.366 The adoption of the Brown factors though, should positively impact the criminal justice system in North
Dakota.367 By adopting the four-prong test, the court further enabled criminal defense attorneys to advocate for added protections under the North Dakota Constitution.368 The adoption of the test in Gay should also encourage
law enforcement officers to be well-educated on Fourth Amendment law.369
Further, the decision will aid the district courts in evaluating Fourth
Amendment issues.370
A. CONSIDERATIONS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
In Gay, the North Dakota Supreme Court clarified one facet of interaction between Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections in North Dakota.371

360. Id. ¶ 32, 748 N.W.2d at 420.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. ¶ 33.
366. Id. ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d at 417.
367. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-B (discussing the positive impacts that Gay will have in
North Dakota).
368. See discussion infra Part IV.A (recognizing that criminal defense attorneys are free to
argue that the North Dakota Constitution affords greater protections than the federal constitution).
369. See discussion infra Part IV.B (examining the effects of Gay on North Dakota’s law
enforcement officials).
370. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the effects of Gay on North Dakota’s district
courts).
371. See Gay, ¶ 21, 748 N.W.2d at 416 (addressing the interaction between the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments).
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The court held that administration of Miranda warnings does not cure an
unlawful seizure.372 The court, however, neglected an opportunity to broaden Fourth Amendment protections under the North Dakota Constitution.373
Instead, the court adopted the federal standard for examining the attenuation
exception to the exclusionary rule.374 The court neither diluted nor augmented the exclusionary rule’s potency in North Dakota.375
Under the North Dakota Constitution, the court in Gay was free to provide a more stringent attenuation rule for citizens, rather than replicating the
analysis set forth in Brown.376 Former Justice William J. Brennan of the
United States Supreme Court once stated that “[t]he legal revolution which
has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—for without it, the full realization of
our liberties cannot be guaranteed.”377 By merely adopting the Brown factors, the North Dakota Supreme Court further empowered criminal defense
attorneys to argue for a more protective rule, or set of factors, in analyzing a
situation similar to Gay.378 The federal constitution and the Brown decision
set the minimum for constitutional protections, not the maximum.379
The framers of the North Dakota Constitution intended to grant broader
individual rights than those guaranteed by the federal constitution.380 The
North Dakota Supreme Court is responsible for interpreting the basic individual rights afforded by the state constitution.381 By not arguing state constitutional protections, defense attorneys would deprive criminal defendants

372. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 748 N.W.2d at 416-17.
373. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 156-74 (recognizing that a search or seizure may not
violate the federal constitution but may still offend a state constitution). The parallel language
from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution appears in Article 1, Section 8 of
the North Dakota Constitution. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8.
374. Gay, ¶¶ 24, 25, 748 N.W.2d at 417.
375. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975) (declaring that “the exclusionary rule
would be substantially diluted” if Miranda warnings alone could dissipate the taint of unconstitutional arrests).
376. See State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 212 (N.D. 1988) (stating that the North Dakota
Supreme Court, as a matter of state constitutional law, may advance greater protections than those
provided by the federal constitution).
377. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
378. See id. at 502 (arguing that United States Supreme Court decisions should not be dispositive of questions regarding individual rights afforded by counterpart provisions of state law).
379. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 219 (Levine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
380. Lynn M. Boughey, An Introduction to North Dakota Constitutional Law: Contents and
Methods of Interpretation, 63 N.D. L. REV. 157, 253-59 (1987).
381. See State v. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d 152, 160 (N.D. 1996) (Levine, Surr. J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the North Dakota Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the North Dakota
Constitution and that independent interpretation of the state constitution is a fundamental principle
of federalism).
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of one aspect of their basic rights and ignore principles of federalism.382
While Gay does not afford individuals greater protections under the state
constitution, the decision will aid the district courts in analyzing similar
search and seizure issues.383 The decision may also prompt law enforcement to further educate officers on Fourth Amendment law.384
B. CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE DISTRICT COURTS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT
The exclusionary rule acts as a deterrent to police misconduct by excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.385 The attenuation factors from Gay minimize the likelihood that officers will make
investigatory arrests in order to elicit incriminating statements.386 The court
declared that evidence derived from such investigatory arrests is not made
admissible at trial by merely administering Miranda warnings.387 Gay
communicates to police officers that unlawful arrests followed by an administration of the Miranda warnings is not per se sufficient to remedy the
Fourth Amendment violation.388 This deterrent effect should prompt police
officers to act in compliance with the Fourth Amendment and encourage
police organizations to offer training on Fourth Amendment procedures.389
Further, the exclusionary sanction focuses on the misbehavior of an individual officer, but may be a more effective deterrent if police departments
disciplined officers for committing blatant Fourth Amendment violations.390
Professor Wayne R. LaFave, an expert on the Fourth Amendment, stated
this proposition best: “to apply the exclusionary rule when an individual officer oversteps his bounds but not when the violation of the Fourth
Amendment is caused by systemic defects would be to turn the Fourth
382. See Brennan, supra note 377, at 502 (proclaiming that a failure to argue state constitutional questions in state courts would be unwise).
383. See State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d 408, 417 (enumerating a four-prong
test to determine whether Miranda warnings cure an unlawful seizure).
384. See generally Kevin Jon Heller & John Paul Reichmuth, Lying in Wait for the Good
Faith Exception, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 54 (suggesting that law enforcement officers
should be familiar with all established Fourth Amendment law).
385. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
386. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975) (stating that unlawful arrests would be
encouraged if officers knew that giving Miranda warnings would cure the violations).
387. Gay, ¶ 22, 748 N.W.2d at 416-17 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 602).
388. See id. (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 601-02) (stating that the Miranda warnings are not a
“cure-all” to an unlawful arrest).
389. Heller & Reichmuth, supra note 384, at 54 n.126 (discussing defense attorneys’ roles in
raising the standard of “reasonableness” applied to law enforcement in order to defeat arguments
made under the good faith exception to a warrantless search).
390. See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1050
(1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule does not account for a police officer’s regard for departmental expectations).
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Amendment on its head.”391 By upholding the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, the North Dakota Supreme Court provided motivation for law
enforcement organizations to further educate and train officers in Fourth
Amendment law.392 Some scholars, however, contend that the exclusionary
rule has no influence on police whatsoever.393
Studies of police practices demonstrate that the exclusionary rule does
not deter violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights where officers are
willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving an alternative goal.394 Some authors have even suggested that officers may commit
perjury in order to avoid application of the exclusionary rule.395 The district
courts must counteract these unlawful actions.396 These offensive behaviors
may be monitored by the district courts, and judges should take care not to
accept these behaviors in order to prevent imposing the exclusionary sanction.397 The district courts are in a better position to be the “guardians of
our liberties” than the appellate courts.398 The district courts can utilize the
factors adopted in Gay as guideposts in analyzing whether Miranda warnings cure an unlawful seizure.399
Gay offers further guidance to the district courts in analyzing the interaction between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.400 Additionally, the rejection of a per se rule stating that Miranda warnings cure an unlawful seizure communicates to police that Fourth Amendment violations are not

391. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 48 (arguing against a general “good faith” exception to the
exclusionary rule).
392. Heller & Reichmuth, supra note 384, at 54 n.126.
393. See Kaplan, supra note 390, at 1032-33 (stating that the exclusionary rule has fallen
short of its goal in deterring police misconduct); Brent D. Stratton, The Attenuation Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in Attenuated Principle and Dissipated Logic, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 139, 162-64 (1984) (arguing that the attenuation exception undermines the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule).
394. Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright
Lines” and “Good Faith”, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 318-19 (1982) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 14 (1968)).
395. Kaplan, supra note 390, at 1038 (citing JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLUE KNIGHT 178220 (1972)).
396. Brennan, supra note 377, at 491 (asserting that the state courts must guard state citizens’ liberties).
397. See Kaplan, supra note 390, at 1038-39 (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme
Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 792 (1970)) (stating
that trial judges are often ambivalent and eager to believe the police in order to prevent imposition
of the exclusionary rule).
398. Brennan, supra note 377, at 491 (stating that state courts, no less than federal, are in a
position to guard individual liberties).
399. See State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d 408, 417 (adopting four factors to analyze whether Miranda warnings attenuate the taint of a Fourth Amendment violation).
400. See id. (enumerating four attenuation factors).
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simply remedied by administering the warnings.401 The decision should, in
turn, encourage law enforcement to become well-educated on search and
seizure issues.402 Finally, the court’s adoption of Brown’s federal standard
allows criminal defense attorneys to continue arguing for broader protections under the state constitution.403
V. CONCLUSION
In Gay, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted four attenuation factors to analyze whether incriminating statements obtained after an unlawful
arrest are barred by the exclusionary rule.404 These factors include: (1)
whether Miranda warnings were administered prior to the statements; (2)
the temporal proximity of the statements to the unlawful seizure; (3) whether any intervening causes exist between the seizure and the statements; and
(4) the purpose or flagrancy of the police misconduct.405 Applying these
factors to the facts in Gay, the court held that the district court properly
suppressed the defendant’s statements.406 The court determined that the
stop of the vehicle the defendant rode in was constitutional, based on the
driver’s status as a probationer.407 Additionally, the court concluded that
the detention and frisk of the defendant was constitutional because of the
officers’ concerns for safety.408 Finally, the court held that keeping a suspect detained in handcuffs after officers dispel their concerns for safety violates the Fourth Amendment.409
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